Insider threats rank among the most dangerous tactics in cyber-crime. Few employees face them, and even fewer speak about their experiences.
I recently became one of those rare cases. A criminal group approached me with a shocking proposal: betray my employer for millions.
Sudden approach
The first message arrived without warning. “If you are interested, we can offer you 15% of any ransom payment if you give us access to your PC.”
The sender called themselves Syndicate. They contacted me in July via Signal, an encrypted messaging app. I did not know them, but I quickly understood their intention.
They wanted me to help infiltrate my employer’s systems. Their plan: steal data or install malware, then demand ransom. I would secretly receive a cut.
Rising global risk
Insider betrayal is increasingly common. Days earlier, Brazilian police arrested an IT worker accused of selling login credentials. Investigators linked the case to a $100m banking loss.
I consulted a senior editor and chose to play along. I wanted to see how criminals pitch these schemes.
Syndicate, later renaming themselves Syn, explained the plan in detail.
The enticing offer
Syn asked me to provide login credentials and security codes. Their team would hack my employer and demand bitcoin ransom. I would receive a share.
The offer escalated quickly. “What if you took 25% of the final negotiation? We extract 1% of total revenue. You would never need to work again.”
Syn claimed the ransom could reach tens of millions. Authorities strongly advise against paying, but Syn promised secrecy and wealth.
Insider deals
Syn insisted the gang had succeeded before. He named two victims: a UK healthcare company and a US emergency services provider.
“You’d be surprised how many employees give us access,” he said confidently.
He identified himself as “reach out manager” for Medusa, a ransomware-as-a-service group. He claimed to be western and the only English speaker in the gang.
Medusa operates like a criminal platform. Affiliates use its tools to hack organisations. Researchers say its leaders operate from Russia or allied states.
The group avoids Russian targets and advertises on Russian-language dark web forums.
Mounting pressure
Syn sent a US alert about Medusa, listing 300 victims. He shared darknet links and recruitment pages, urging me to deposit 0.5 bitcoin, around $55,000.
He described the deposit as guaranteed once I handed over credentials. “We aren’t bluffing. We are only here for money.”
He assumed I had privileged access. He asked technical questions and sent code to run on my laptop. I refused.
Escalation
After three days, I stalled, planning to alert the security team. Syn grew impatient.
“When can you do this? I’m not a patient person,” he warned. “I guess you don’t want to live on the beach in the Bahamas?”
He set a strict deadline. Then the harassment escalated.
My phone flooded with login requests. Every minute, the security app asked me to approve access.
I recognised the tactic: MFA bombing. Hackers overwhelm victims until they approve a request. Uber suffered this attack in 2022.
It was alarming. The private chat had turned into direct pressure on my phone. It felt like intruders pounding at my door.
Cutting access
I knew one wrong tap would give them full control. The system would treat it as a normal login. From there, they could explore sensitive networks.
I contacted the security team. We disconnected me completely: no email, no intranet, no accounts.
That evening, Syn sent a calm message. “The team apologises. We were testing your login page and are sorry if this caused issues.”
I explained I was locked out. Syn repeated the offer. I ignored him. Days later, he deleted his Signal account.
A sobering lesson
Eventually, my access was restored with stronger protections. The incident gave me firsthand insight into insider threat tactics.
Hackers constantly adapt and target insiders. Until this happened, I had not fully understood the risks.
It was a sobering reminder of the dangers every organisation faces today.
